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legal and legislative issues
Two education-
related cases 
continue to be topics 
of discussion at the 
Supreme Court.
Supreme Court Docket 
Preview: Are Changes 
in the Offing?
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.
During most Supreme Court terms, which begin on the first Monday in October and usually end in late June, the justices accept at least 
one case focused on education. Two cases 
before the current Court—Fisher v. Univer-
sity of Texas (2014) and Friedrichs v. Cali-
fornia Teachers Association (2014)—have 
the potential to affect education significantly. 
Moreover, the sudden death of Supreme 
Court Justice Antonin Scalia on Saturday, 
February 13, 2016, may affect these and 
other cases, especially Fisher, considerably.
Making its second trip to the Supreme 
Court, Fisher reviews the use of race in 
higher-education admissions, a practice 
known as affirmative action or race-based 
admissions policies. Even though set in the 
context of higher education, Fisher is likely 
the more important and far-reaching of 
the two cases because its outcome has the 
potential to affect K–12 education 
with regard to student admissions and 
hiring.
Friedrichs examines whether unions may 
require nonmembers to pay fair-share fees, 
a prorated portion of dues, to contribute 
to the cost of collective bargaining, or 
whether doing so results in impermissible 
compelled speech and association in viola-
tion of the First Amendment. The way the 
Court answers Friedrichs could affect school 
board–employee relations as well as district 
finances if officials do not have to continue 
deducting fair-share fees from nonunion 
teachers’ paychecks.
Although the cases are unrelated con-
ceptually, coincidentally, after the Supreme 
Court conducted oral arguments in Fisher 
on December 15, 2015, its next scheduled 
session was to hear Friedrichs on January 
11, 2016.
Fisher v. University of Texas
Fisher v. University of Texas was filed by 
two white female high school graduates who 
were denied entry to the university in the 
fall of 2008 under a policy admitting the top 
10% of graduating classes. The plaintiffs 
alleged that Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law—
designed to increase minority enrollments by 
granting automatic admissions to students 
graduating in the top 10% of their classes—
discriminated against them because of race 
in violation of their right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and fed-
eral statutes. Applicants who do not gradu-
ate in the top 10% of their class can still 
gain admission by scoring high in a process 
that evaluates their talents, leadership quali-
ties, family circumstances, and race.
One of the students withdrew from the 
case, but Fisher, who was in the top 12% of 
her class, remained active in the case even 
though she attended, and graduated from, 
Louisiana State University.
Judicial History 
In the initial round of litigations in Fisher v. 
University of Texas (2009), a federal trial 
court granted the university’s motion for 
summary judgment because it was satis-
fied that the use of race in admissions was 
supported by a compelling interest that 
was narrowly tailored to achieve its desired 
end. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit (2011a, 
2011b) relied on the same rationale, affirm-
ing that insofar as the university had not 
surpassed a critical mass of minority stu-
dents that would have rendered race-based 
considerations unnecessary, the plan was 
constitutional.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear an 
appeal in what is known as Fisher I (2012), 
reversing in favor of the student in a 7–1 
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judgment. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy was 
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts 
along with Associate Justices Scalia, 
Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, 
Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dis-
sented. Justice Elena Kagan did not 
participate because she was involved 
in Fisher I while working as the fed-
eral solicitor general.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Fisher I began by identifying the 
issue before the Supreme Court as to 
whether the Fifth Circuit followed 
“decisions interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . .” (p. 2416). Hav-
ing determined that the Fifth Circuit 
failed to apply strict scrutiny—the 
highest level of constitutional analy-
sis under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s equal protection clause and 
the test most diffi cult for a state 
to meet—the Court reversed and 
remanded for further consideration.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s 
own precedent in affi rmative action 
cases, Justice Kennedy pointed out 
that “any offi cial action that treats 
a person differently on account of 
his race or ethnic origin is inherently 
suspect” (p. 2419). In other words, 
even though the justices agreed that 
offi cials demonstrated that diversity 
was a compelling interest essen-
tial to the university’s mission, the 
policy was subjected to strict scru-
tiny because the university failed to 
devise a plan narrowly tailored to 
achieve its goal without impermissi-
bly using a race-conscious remedy.
Justice Kennedy explained that 
offi cials must demonstrate that “no 
workable race-neutral alternatives 
would produce the educational 
benefi ts of diversity” (p. 2420). Con-
cluding that the Fifth Circuit failed 
to apply the proper standard, the 
Court reversed the panel’s earlier 
order and directed it to apply a more 
stringent form of review.
In a one-paragraph concurrence, 
Justice Scalia (2013, p. 2422) largely 
reiterated his opposition to what he 
described as governmental discrimi-
nation based on race.
Justice Thomas’s lengthy concur-
rence (p. 2422) would have over-
ruled Grutter v. Bollinger (2003). In 
Grutter, the Supreme Court upheld 
the affi rmative action admissions 
policy in the law school at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, noting that 
insofar as diversity is a compelling 
government interest, race could be 
used as a factor because the criteria 
were suffi ciently narrowly tailored to 
achieve the compelling state interest 
of having a racially diverse student 
body. Justice Thomas joined the 
majority, agreeing that it correctly 
directed the Fifth Circuit to apply 
strict scrutiny on remand.
Justice Ginsburg’s brief dissent 
maintained that insofar as she 
thought the Fifth Circuit correctly 
applied the Supreme Court’s prec-
edent, its judgment should have 
remained in place (Fisher I, p. 2432).
On Remand
On remand, with one member of a 
three-judge panel in Fisher I (2014a) 
dissenting, the Fifth Circuit again 
deferred to the authority of univer-
sity offi cials in upholding the admis-
sions policy. The dissenter would 
have invalidated the admissions 
policy as insuffi ciently narrowly tai-
lored to achieve its goal of diversity 
because it relied too heavily on race. 
The Fifth Circuit (2014b) rejected 
an appeal for a review by all of its 
members in an en banc hearing.
The Supreme Court accepted 
another appeal in what is now Fisher 
II (2015). As in Fisher I, Justice 
Kagan recused herself in Fisher II.
Friedrichs v. California 
Teachers Association
At issue in Friedrichs v. Califor-
nia Teachers Association (2014) 
is the status of fair-share fees that 
California state law, consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent, allows 
unions to charge nonmembers for 
expenses germane to collective bar-
gaining. Under this law, nonmem-
bers can petition the unions to opt 
out of the nonchargeable portion of 
the fair-share fees they pay by seek-
ing rebates for costs not associated 
with bargaining.
Public school teachers who 
resigned their union memberships 
because they objected to paying the 
nonchargeable portion of agency 
fees—joined by the Christian Edu-
cators Association International, 
a nonprofi t organization serv-
ing Christians working in public 
schools, which raised the same 
issue—challenged the constitutional-
ity of fair-share fees. The teachers 
sued their local union and its offi -
cials as well at the National Educa-
tion Association and the California 
Teachers Association. The teachers 
claimed that having to make fi nan-
cial payments to support the unions 
violated their rights to free speech 
and association because they had 
to submit to opt-out procedures to 
avoid making those contributions to 
nonchargeable union expenses.
A federal trial court in Califor-
nia, in a brief unpublished opin-
ion, began by relying on Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education (1977), 
the fi rst dispute in K–12 schooling 
in which the Supreme Court allowed 
unions to collect fair-share fees from 
nonmembers to support collective-
bargaining activities. The court also 
cited another case from California, 
The teachers claimed that having to make fi nancial 
payments to support the unions violated their rights 
to free speech and association because they had to 
submit to opt-out procedures to avoid making those 
contributions to nonchargeable union expenses.
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Mitchell v. Los Angeles Unified 
School District (1992), wherein the 
Ninth Circuit, following the lead of 
Abood, viewed the opt-out provision 
as constitutional because the First 
Amendment does not require an opt-
in procedure for nonunion members 
to pay fees equal to the full amount 
of dues. The court thus granted the 
unions’ motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, meaning that it found no 
reason for the dispute to head to 
trial.
In a brief, unpublished two-
sentence opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
summarily affirmed in favor of the 
unions. The court ruled that “the 
questions presented in this appeal 
are so insubstantial as not to require 
further argument, because they are 
governed by controlling Supreme 
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent” 
(Friedrichs 2014, p. *1).
The teachers sought further 
review from the Supreme Court, 
which agreed to hear an appeal in 
Friedrichs (2015).
Reflections on Fisher
Fisher is the latest dispute in the 
more than 40-year history of affir-
mative action in higher education 
that began in 1974 with the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in De Funis v. 
Odegaard. In De Funis, the justices 
sidestepped the claims of a white 
male law student who challenged the 
affirmative action policy at the Uni-
versity of Washington, rejecting his 
claim as moot insofar as he was in 
the final semester of his studies.
Illustrative of the impact of 
affirmative action in education, 
the Supreme Court upheld race-
conscious admissions policies in 
medical (Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke 1978) and law 
school (Grutter v. Bollinger 2003) 
admissions, but not for undergradu-
ate programs (Gratz v. Bollinger 
2002).
Further, in the first of two cases 
from K–12 education, the Court 
invalidated the use of race where 
it was the only criterion used in 
teacher layoffs (Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education 1989). The 
Court later rejected the use of race 
as a tiebreaker in assigning students 
to oversubscribed high schools as 
part of redressing educational equi-
ties in Louisville, Kentucky, and 
Seattle, Washington. The Court 
reasoned that the plans were invalid 
because officials in both districts not 
only failed to demonstrate how the 
use of racial classifications in the stu-
dent assignment plans was necessary 
to achieve their desired goal of racial 
diversity but also overlooked alter-
native approaches (Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1 2007a).
Fourteen years ago, in Grutter v. 
Bollinger (2002), Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s majority opinion sug-
gested, without offering a justifica-
tion for this time frame, that “[w]
e expect that 25 years from now, 
the use of racial preferences will no 
longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today” (p. 343). 
In light of the Supreme Court’s 
agreeing to review the way in which 
officials at the University of Texas 
applied the admissions policy, it 
remains to be seen whether that 
25-year window Justice O’Connor 
described may be closing and, if so, 
what the justices may offer instead.
Reflections on Friedrichs
Having allowed unions to collect 
fair-share fees from nonmembers 
in Abood, the Supreme Court later 
reined in labor organizations by 
requiring their officials to account 
more carefully for how they spend 
funds on activities unrelated to bar-
gaining. In fact, the Court limited 
the reach of unions by agreeing 
with nonmembers that requiring 
them to pay for positions they do 
not support and that are unrelated 
to bargaining violates their First 
Amendment rights to free speech 
and association.
Less than a decade after Abood, in 
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 
1, v. Hudson (1986), the Supreme 
Court invalidated a rebate system 
because it created a risk that monies 
collected from nonmembers might 
have been temporarily used for 
union purposes.
In a dispute from Michigan 
involving a faculty union in a pub-
lic college, a holding that has been 
applied in K–12 disputes (Lehnert 
v. Ferris Faculty Association 1991), 
the Court observed that unions 
could charge nonmembers for only 
those expenses germane to bargain-
ing, such as publications addressing 
negotiations as well as teaching and 
education generally, professional 
development, and employment 
opportunities. The Court refused to 
permit the union to charge nonmem-
bers for the costs of lobbying and 
general public relations activities.
Most recently, in a nonschool case 
from Illinois (Harris v. Quinn 2014), 
the Supreme Court’s judgment could 
foreshadow further restrictions in 
Friedrichs over the ability of teacher 
unions to collect fair-share fees. 
Although stopping short of invali-
dating Abood, the Court decided 
that health care workers could 
not be compelled to pay fair-share 
fees to support union speech and 
expressive activities with which they 
disagreed.
Against this backdrop, Friedrichs 
has two potential major ramifica-
tions if the Supreme Court follows 
its post-Abood trend.
First, if the justices continue to 
restrict or eliminate the ability of 
unions to collect fair-share fees 
from nonmembers in the District 
of Columbia and in about half of 
the states allowing for this practice, 
then teacher unions would face the 
possible loss of significant amounts 
of revenues for nonbargaining activi-
ties, such as supporting political 
candidates and other noneducational 
initiatives.
Second, the possible elimination of 
or having restrictions placed on fair-
share fees may encourage members 
to resign from their unions, thereby 
further weakening the position of 
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K–12 teacher unions. It bears watch-
ing for the impact that Friedrichs 
may have on K–12 teacher unions 
and their school systems.
Conclusion
The death of a sitting justice is 
uncommon, so when it does occur, 
it can have major consequences. 
Justice Scalia was a long-time critic 
of race-based admissions in higher 
education, and his death is likely 
to have a greater impact on Fisher 
than Friedrichs because he would, 
in all probability, have been in the 
majority if, as anticipated, a closely 
divided Supreme Court invalidated 
the affirmative action policy at 
issue (Barnes 2016). The upshot is 
that Fisher appears to be destined 
to end in a 4–4 plurality, meaning 
that without a clear majority, it is a 
deadlock that would leave the lower 
court order upholding the policy 
in place but not providing binding 
precedent as guidance. Thus, Jus-
tice Scalia’s death will likely leave 
the status of race-based admissions 
unresolved and in need of additional 
litigation.
Justice Scalia’s death is less likely 
to have as significant an impact in 
Friedrichs because, on the basis of 
oral arguments before the Court, 
commentators sensed that the issue 
of whether unions can continue 
to charge agency fees to nonmem-
bers would not have hinged on a 
single vote, his or another justice’s 
(Ahlquist 2016).
These two key education cases 
aside, with the Supreme Court just 
about evenly divided between, to use 
common labels, activist or liberal 
and originalist or conservative jus-
tices, Justice Scalia’s death is likely 
to tip this delicate balance in many 
areas affecting American schooling 
and all areas of the broader society. 
It certainly bears watching to see 
who will be appointed in Justice Sca-
lia’s stead on the high court bench.
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• The formula has not changed to 
accommodate disproportionate 
increases in special education 
and health insurance, thus actual 
required expenditures for those 
two categories are significantly 
higher than planned and the 
money must come from the other 
seven categories, avoiding harm to 
classroom instruction to the great-
est extent possible.
• Schools continue to demand addi-
tional funding in order to provide 
teacher and student coaching to 
excel on high-stakes exams.
• Public employees in Massa-
chusetts, including most school 
personnel, belong to unions. Con-
tracts dictate not only compensa-
tion and benefits, but terms of the 
working day, year, and to some 
extent, duties.
• Salaries are comparatively high, 
in part because Massachusetts 
has a high cost of living, and also 
because teachers are required to 
be certified in their instructional 
fields and must have or obtain a 
master’s degree by the end of their 
fifth year as a teacher.
• Administrative and support staffs 
and services are being stretched 
past the breaking point.
Clearly there continue to be many 
challenges to reaching the goal of 
success for every student within the 
limits of available resources.
Students come to school with 
ever greater complexities in their 
own lives and in their educational 
needs. Increasingly in Massachusetts 
the schools are seen as the place 
where all needs—educational and 
beyond—must be met.
Gail M. Zeman is a consulting school 
business administrator and past presi-
dent of the Massachusetts ASBO. Email: 
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